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ABSTRACT 
This research examined {1) whether cognit1ve level 
affected infant and toddler performance and affective 
responses in part-whole tasks; {2) whether salience of the 
missing body parts of a doll affected infant's performance 
and affective responses in part-whole tasks; {3) if the 
interaction between cognitive level and sal1ence of the 
missing body parts affected infant's performance and 
affective responses in part-whole tasks. Infants were first 
given Uzgiris and Hunt's {1975; 1989) object permanence 
tasks to determine their cognitive levels. After the object 
permanence tasks, infants at cognitive levels four, five, 
and six were given the part-whole tasks where the arm, leg, 
or head of a doll with removable parts were dismembered. 
Amount of visual and manual search were later scored at a 
range of 1- 7, latency to visual and manual search were 
timed in seconds, and affective responses were scored at a 
range of 1 - 3. Infants were given two trials with the 
part-whole tasks. Results for the part-whole tasks were 
added to give a total score for each m1ssing body part. 
Results showed significant differences in the cognitive 
levels in the amount of visual and manual search, latency to 
visual and manual search, and affective responses of 
1nfants' performance in the part-whole tasks. 
Vlli 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Piaget's (1952; 1954) studies of children's cognitive 
development have dominated past research (Small, 1990; 
Bjorklund, 1989). A majority of this research focused 
primarily on the sensorimotor stage of infant development 
between zero to 24~months. 
The development of object permanence closely follows 
Piaget's (1952; 1954) stages of sensorimotor development. 
Object permanence is referred to as the knowledge that an 
object exists in time and space independent of one's 
perception or action on the object (Baillargeon, 1986; 
Bjorklund, 1989; Piaget, 1954; Small, 1990). As adults, we 
understand that objects still exist even if they are not 
visible. Infants, however, do not have the concept of an 
"absent" object. Objects that are not visible to infants 
may well be non-existent to the infants (Bjorklund, 1989; 
Small, 1990; Piaget, 1954). 
The development of object permanence is one of the most 
widely researched topics within the sensorimotor stage 
(Bjorklund, 1989; Sophian, 1980; Townes, 1979). 
To attain object permanence, infants must be able to 
coordinate their visual, audio, and tactile skills (Piaget, 
1 
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1954). Piaget (1954) suggested that before infants succeed 
in object permanence tasks, they go through a stage of 
reconstructing part of an object and inferring it as a 
whole object. For example, Piaget (1954) described the 
behavior pattern of part-whole perception in this 
observation: 
When I make only part of the bottle 
disappear and Laurent sees a small 
fraction of it near my hand, or a cloth, 
or the table, the manifestations of his 
desire are more imperious than when he saw 
the whole bottle 
(1954, p. 31) • 
... Laurent recognizes his bottle no 
matter what part of it is visible. If 
he sees the nipple, his reaction is 
natural, but even when he sees the wrong 
end his desire is the same; hence he 
admits to the virtual entireness of the 
bottle. 
(1954, p. 31). 
From these behaviors Piaget inferred that infants 
remembered the whole object(s) when only a small portion 
was visible. Therefore memory development in infants is 
among the factors 1nfluencing 1nfants' performance on 
object permanence tasks. 
Although research in obJect permanence is plentiful, 
(Baillargeon, 1986; 1987; Bjorklund, 1989; Sophian, 1980; 
Townes, 1979), research on part-whole perceptions in 
infancy remains sparse. One exception was a study by 
Shafie, Self, and Allen (1984). Their findings supported 
Piaget and Inhelder's (1973) ideas on three types of 
3 
memory: recognition, reconstruction, and recall. Shafie, 
Self, and Allen (1984) suggested that younger infants 
performed poorly on reconstructive memory tasks mainly due 
to their lack of representational capacity. The responses 
of infants in the twelve to fifteen and sixteen to nineteen 
month age groups as they retrieved the incomplete part of 
an object provided evidence of reconstructive memory at 
these ages. The diversity of infant behaviors which have 
been examined have offered a rich source of evidence 
concerning different forms of memory in infancy (Sophian, 
1980) . 
The majority of studies on part-whole perceptions, 
however, have focused on preoperational children's 
perceptions of 1ncomplete pictures of objects, animals, or 
fruits and vegetables (Elkind & Scott ,1962; Elkind, 
Koegler, & Go, 1964; Gollin, 1960; 1961; 1962,; 1966; 
Whiteside, Elkind, & Golbeck, 1976; Lange & Geis, 1977; 
Murray & Szymczyk, 1978). These studies have indicated 
that correct responses to the incomplete pictures were 
correlated with children's higher cognitive level. 
Subjects in these studies were considerably older than the 
subjects used in the present study of object permanence. 
This present study explored infant's part-whole 
perception within the context of obJect permanence. It was 
expected that there would be a posit1ve relationshlp 
between latency of visual and manual search, the infant's 
amount of visual and manual search, the infant's affective 
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response, and the salience of a feature of an object when 
it is being transformed invisibly with an infant's 
cognitive level. It was also expected that gender 
differences would not be significant in this study because 
literature on object permanence does not reveal gender as 
significant (Bjorklund, 1989). 
Object permanence was measured by levels of manual 
search, visual search, and affective response. Upon 
determining the child's level of object permanence, part-
whole relations were ascertained through the child's 
responses to the salience of various missing parts. 
Purpose of Study 
Piaget's (1954) study of cognitive development, 
especially object permanence, has generated numerous 
studies. When looking at infants' achievements of various 
tasks in each stage of development, Piaget failed to 
include the importance of infants' socio-emotional 
development in his literature. This study attempted to 
look at infants' socio-emotional development by looking at 
affect when they retrieved an object (i.e, a doll) which 
was whole when it was displaced visibly. The experimenter 
complicated the procedure by removing the limb of the doll 
beneath the cover while at the same time, exposing the part 
of the limb that was intact in order to entice infants to 
retrieve the doll. Following retrieval of the object, 
infants' reactions to the now incomplete object were noted. 
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This study will hopefully generate interests in the area of 
infants' part-whole perceptions in cognitive development. 
The primary purpose of this study was to examine the 
amount of visual and manual search, latency of visual and 
manual search, and affective response of infants between 
the ages of nine and twenty-four months following retrieval 
of an incomplete object. 
A secondary purpose of this study was to determine 
whether infants, within their stage of development, use 
memory structures, such as reconstructive, recollection, or 
recall memory, to search f9r the doll's missing body parts. 
The following literature review addressed several 
aspects of object permanence: visual tracking, visible 
displacement tasks, memory, and part-whole relations. 
Before addressing the literature pertinent to object 
permanence, however, several theories regarding object 
permanence were explored. 
CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Piaget 
The understanding of object permanence does not usually 
occur until infants reach the fourth substage of the 
sensorimotor period. At this time infants are capable of 
searching actively for vanished objects. Prior to this 
stage, when objects disappear in front of 1nfants, they 
continue gazing at the spot where objects had disappeared 
(Baillargeon, 1986; Baillargeon & Graber, 1987; Bjorklund, 
1989; Piaget, 1954). When objects failed to reappear, 
infants gave up searching for the object (Balllargeon, 1986; 
Baillargeon & Graber, 1987 Bjorklund, 1989; Piaget, 1954). 
Infants who searched actively for the object, however, had 
obtained object permanence. 
Piaget (1954} determined that there were three types of 
search. First, visual tracking involved looking at the 
place where the object disappeared. Second, knowledge of 
visible displacement occurred when 1nfants searched for the 
vanished object with1n their perceptual field. Finally, 
knowledge of invisible displacement took place if infants 
searched for the object that disappeared outside of their 
perceptual field. Infants were also capable of following 
6 
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multiple displacements of objects as they grew older. Such 
behaviors normally occurred when infants were between the 
ages of eight to twenty-four months. 
In addition, Piaget examined part-whole perceptions, 
visual tracking, AB error, visible displacement of objects, 
invisible displacement of objects, and infant's memory and 
information processing as infants attained object 
permanence. Part-whole perceptions referred to infants' 
reconstructions of an invisible whole from a visible part of 
an object (Piaget, 1954). Visual tracking referred to the 
tracking of the trajectory of an object visually when 
infants were incapable of grasping or actively searching for 
the hidden object. AB error occurred when an object was 
hidden under a first screen, and infants removed the screen 
to recover the object. In the next task, when the object 
was hidden under screen B, infants instead of looking for 
the object at the second location, tried retriev1ng the 
object at location A. Visible displacement was when an 
object was hidden within the full view of the infants. 
Invisible displacement referred to the object being hidden 
without the infants' knowledge. Finally, memory and 
1nformation processing referred to, (1) whether infants 
would use recall, long term, or short term memory to 
retrieve the hidden object and, (2) to see how infants' 
code, or encode information to look for the object. 
Stages played an important role in Piaget's model of 
development (Beilin, 1989, p. 88). Stages of development, 
according to Piaget, were constant, (i.e.) independent of 
speeding up or delays due to experience or the social 
context (Piaget, 1983). 
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Development of object permanence, therefore, occurred 
within the six sensorimotor stages of Piaget's theory. 
Infants went through these stages at different times. 
Skills achieved were not lost as infants moved on to 
different stages (Piaget, 1952). 
Piaget (1952; 1954) described the development of the 
object concept as one of the major accomplishments of 
sensorimotor intelligence. According to Piaget (1954), 
infants did not understand the concept of obJect permanence 
the way adults understood object permanences. Adults 
believed that an object cannot exist at two separate places 
in time without having also existed during the interval 
between them (Baillargeon, 1987; Piaget, 1954). The 
infants' world, on the other hand, consisted of pictures 
which might be analyzed and recognized, and which 
disappeared and reappeared (Piaget, 1954). 
In order for infants to develop object permanence, 
Piaget (1954) believed that they must go through some very 
rigid stages involving coordination of sight and behavior, 
which resulted in integration of different schemata. 
Children must know how to visually follow the displaced 
image. When they learned to extend movement of their eyes 
by an appropriate shift of their heads and torsos, they very 
quickly revealed behavior patterns comparable to a search 
for the thing which vanished. Piaget (1954) called this 
example visual accommodation. For example, 
Laurent, as early as the second day, seems 
to seek with his lips the breast which has 
escaped him. From the third day he gropes 
more systematically to find it. He searches 
the same way with his thumb, which brushed his 
mouth or came to it. Thus it seems that 
contact of the lips with the nipple and the 
thumb gives r1se to a pursuit of those objects, 
once they have disappeared, a pursuit connected 
with the reflex activity in the first case 
and with a nascent or acquired habit in the 
second case (P. 9). 
Sensorimotor stage 
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The first stage of the neonates' life was characterized 
by their 1ncessant use of reflexes (e.g., the sucking 
reflex). In The Origins of Intelligence, Piaget (1952), 
reported that sucking reflexes were hereditary, functioned 
from birth, and could be seen as "global schema of 
coordinated movements" (p. 35). The first stage of 
sensorimotor development lasted from birth to the first 
month of life (Dunst, 1982; Piaget, 1952). 
Newborn infants came into this world fully equipped 
with reflexes which later would provide a basis for further 
development (e.g., the sucking reflexes). Neonates might 
not suck simply because they were hungry. Rather the 
sucking was functional assimilation, or a means of getting a 
behavior started (Piaget, 1952). 
During the second substage, roughly from one to four 
months, reflexes such as sucking, looking, hearing, 
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vocalizing, and the act of grasping, seizing or, taking hold 
of objects began to develop (Flavell 1985; Piaget, 1952). 
During this period, infants had strong tendency to bring 
anything that they found into their mouths. According to 
Piaget (1952), infants must establish eye-hand coordination 
before succeeding in these tasks. 
In the third substage (i.e., from about four to eight 
months) involved infants expanding their horizons. They no 
longer were satisfied with finding objects and bringing them 
to their mouths. They began to incorporate their other 
abilities, including crawling and manipulating of objects. 
Piaget (1952) called this the "secondary circular react1.ons" 
stage. Infants during this stage were more aware of the 
external environment (Ginsburg & Opper, 1979; Piaget, 1952). 
The fourth substage, from about eight to twelve months, 
marked the beginning of intentionality and means-ends 
behavior of infants (Flavell, 1985). The infants 
intercoordinated the secondary schemata to obtain object 
permanence. It is during the fourth substage that infants 
knew that objects continued to exist even if they, the 
objects, w~re outside of the infants' perceptual field 
(Gratch & Landers, 1971; Piaget, 1952). Piaget (1952) 
explained the fourth stage as such (p. 211): 
Now, in order that two schemata, until then 
detached, may be coordinated with one another 
in a single act, the subject must aim to 
attain an end which is not directly within 
reach and to put to work, with this intention, 
the schemata thitherto related to other 
situations. Hence there exists simultaneously 
the distinction between the end and the means, 
and the intentional coordination of the 
schemata. 
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The fifth substage, according to Piaget (1952}, marked 
the beginning of novelty search in infants between twelve to 
seventeen months. Piaget (1952} called this the "tertiary 
circular reactions" stage. Piaget (1954) reported that 
infants at this stage used "manifested unexpected behavior 
patterns or experimentation to find out in which aspect an 
object or the event is new" (p. 266}. The tertiary circular 
reactions often led infants to develop new acts of 
intelligence which Piaget (1954) called "discovery of new 
means through active experimentation" (p. 267} . 
Infants during the sixth substage began using 
internalization and mental representation in problem 
solving. They were capable of searching for objects that 
were displaced invisibly (Flavell, 1985; Piaget, 1952; 
Uzgiris & Hunt, 1989). The most important achievement 
during substage six remained the "essential attribute of 
cognitive functioning for the rest of the individual's life" 
(Flavell. 1985, p. 26}. In addition, during this stage, 
infants were also capable of symbolic thoughts (Flavell, 
1985; Piaget, 1952; Uzgiris & Hunt, 1989}. 
Object Permanence 
Piaget 
In describing the development of object permanence, 
Piaget (1954) claimed that object permanence was linked 
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closely to development in the sensorimotor stages, and was 
'constructed little by little'. Piaget (1954) used these 
same six sensorimotor stages to describe infants ' 
acquisition of object permanence. 
During the first two substages, (i.e., zero to four 
months), infants did not exhibit special behavior when 
objects disappeared within their perceptual field. 
Therefore, they did not attempt to search actively for the 
vanished objects. Hence, infants were thought to recognize 
objects only as accompaniments of their own actions. 
Infants might look in the direction the object had 
disappeared, or they might continue to reach for the object 
in ,the direction of last previous contact with the object. 
When the object failed to reappear, infants assumed that the 
object no longer existed (Piaget, 1954). 
According to Piaget (1954), infants limited themselves 
to looking at the place where the objects had vanished if 
experiencing disappearing visual image. Infants merely 
preserved the attitude that if nothing reappeared, they 
would soon give up the search. However, if infants had 
object concept, they would engage in active search for the 
object, removed obstacles, or changed the position of 
presenting objects at hand (Piaget, 1954). 
"During the third substage (i.e., between four to eight 
months), infants' development was seen as the "beginning of 
prehension of things seen and the beginnings of active 
search for vanished objects" (Piaget, 1954, p. 13). Infants 
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were no longer following moving objects, but they were 
beginning to anticipate the future position of the objects, 
finding them after an interruption in following the 
trajectory of the object. Infants, having interrupted an 
activity with an object, were able to locate the object in 
its previous position when returning to the activity. 
Infants would also retrieve a partially hidden object if 
they were capable of reaching for the object. It was still 
too early in infants' development to predict active search 
behavior, which, according to Piaget (1954), would not 
happen for several more months For example, Piaget (1954) 
described that when he presented a small doll to Lucienne 
for the first time, she grasped the doll, examined it 
excitedly, and let it go (unintentionally). Almost 
immediately, Lucienne started looking for the doll in front 
of her but did not see it right away. After she found the 
doll, Piaget took it away from her and hid it under a cover 
before her eyes. Piaget noted that there was no reaction 
from Lucienne (p. 15). 
During the fourth substage, (i.e., between eight to 
twelve months), infants were said to have acquired the 
beginning of active search for the vanished object, but they 
were still unable to take into account the sequence of 
visible displacements. This was the beginning of active 
search behavior (i.e., object permanence) 1n infants. 
During the beginning of object permanence, Piaget (1954) 
found that infants were no longer satisfied with just 
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searching for the vanished object when it was found in the 
extension of accommodation movements. Therefore, they 
actively searched for the object outside of their perceptual 
fields (Gratch & Landers, 1971; Piaget, 1954). That is, 
infants searched for the object even if it was completely 
hidden. Infants, at this substage, were capable of removing 
a screen to continue the activity of searching for the 
object. 
Piaget (1954) discovered that when he hid an object in 
full view of infants in position A, (i.e., when the object 
was hidden under the first screen), they quickly discovered 
the object by removing the screen or the cover. When Piaget 
repeated the same experiment in full view of the infants, 
but, instead of hiding the object in the first screen, 
(position A), he hid the object in position B, (i.e., when 
the object was hidden under the second screen), the infants 
instead of searching at position B where the object was now 
hidden, continued searching at A, making what Piaget called 
the "residual reaction" (1954, p. 51), or perseverative or 
AB error (Bjork & Cummings, 1984; Butterworth, 1977; Dunst, 
I 
1982; Evans & Gratch, 1972; Flavell, 1985; Harris, 1974; 
Pasnak, Kurkjian, & Triana, 1988; Uzgiris & Hunt, 1989). 
During the fifth substage, (i.e., between twelve to 
eighteen months), infants took account of the sequential 
displacements of the object. 
The child learns, during this period, 
to take into account of the sequential 
displacements perceived in the visual 
field; she no longer searches for the 
object in a special position but only 
in the position resulting from the last 
visible displacement. 
(Piaget, 1954: 66). 
For example, when seeing an object being placed in a 
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container, which was then covered with a cloth and removed 
to a different place, infants would searched for the object 
in the container or where it was last seen, not under the 
cloth. 
The fifth substage of developm~nt began when infants no 
longer searched for the object in position A at the time 
they saw the obJect placed in location B. Infants, however, 
were still incapable of searching for an object if it was 
displaced invisibly. The next substage marked the beginning 
of infants' understanding of invisible displacements. 
The sixth substage (i.e., between eighteen to twenty-
four months) marked the beginning of infants' 
accomplishments of representation of invisible 
displacements. During this substage, infants could 
construct objects when "displacements are not all visible". 
By this substage, infants had the capability of resolving 
problems by mental representation {Piaget, 1954, p. 79). 
This skill was not acquired in any of the preceding 
substages. Piaget {1954) described the infant's capability 
to represent invisible displacement of objects in the 
following example: 
Jacqueline watches me when I put a coin 
in my hand, then put my hand under a 
coverlet. I withdrew my hand closed; 
Jacqueline opens it, then searches under 
the coverlet until she finds the object. 
I take back the coin at once, put it in 
my hand and then slip my closed hand under 
a cushion situated at the other side (on 
her left and no longer on her right); 
Jacqueline finds it without hesitation. 
(Piaget, 1954, p. 79) 
Memory 
Piaqet and Inhelder 
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According to Piaget and Inhelder (1973), memory could 
be divided between memory in the strict sense, and memory in 
the wider sense (p. 387), Memory in the wider sense was 
mainly the conservation of everything learned in the past, 
including the various aspects of schemata, or the retention 
of all the products and achievements of one's cognitive 
development to date (Flavell, 1985, p. 208). Memory in the 
strict sense included those forms of conduct that reflected 
the past in terms of the subject's consciousness (e.g., 
recognition, reconstructions, recollections and their 
respective fixations (Piaget and Inhelder, 1973). In other 
words, memory involved the remembering of a specific event, 
accompanied by the definite feeling on the rememberer's part 
that this event occurred at a particular time and place in 
the past, and that he/she personally experienced it 
(Flavell, 1985). This meant that there were developmental 
changes in memory processes during infancy (Flavell, 1985; 
Piaget & Inhelder, 1973). 
Piaget and Inhelder (1973) established three major 
hierarchic types of memory: recognition, reconstruction, 
and recall memory. A detailed discussion of each type of 
memory follows. 
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First, recognition memory relied on perception and 
sensorimotor scheme alone (Piaget, 1968). Recognition 
memory was present during the first few months of life 
(Piaget, 1968). The first of recognition memory appeared 
during the re-awareness of a given object. The time at 
which infants first distinguished their mothers from 
strangers, for example, would be consid7red recognition 
memory {Piaget and Inhelder, 1973). There were three sub-
levels in recognition memory. Elementary recognition, the 
first of the three sub-levels in recognition memory, was 
bound up in the continuation or repetition of a reflex 
action or a potential habit extending that reflex. 
Recognition memory, which follows elementary recognition, 
involved the assimilation of an existing schema, In other 
words, recognition memory encompassed recognition of signs 
as signifiers and was bound up with habits and acts of the 
sensorimotor intelligence. Recognition at the higher 
levels, the third sub-level in recognition memory, was bound 
up with mobile and differentiated schemata. 
The second type of memory, reconstruction memory, 
involved the intentional reproduction of a particular action 
and its results. It involved the recognition of signs and 
was divided into four sub-levels: First, the elementary 
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form of reconstructive memory such as the intentional 
reproduction of an action performed by oneself, or by 
somebody else. Second, the reproduction of an isolated and 
not fully schematized action and subsequent reconstruction 
of its resu~t, third, reconstruction of an object or a 
configuration without prior constructions of an imitative or 
spontaneous kind, and fourth, the reconstruction of a 
schematized action. 
Recall memory depended on actions and action schemata, 
along with ensuring the complete continuity as between 
reconstructions by actions and internalized reconstructions 
represented by the memory-image as the instrument of recall. 
There were three sub-levels of recall memory: 
First, the memory-image of a schematized action or simple 
recall memory which involved complete internalization of 
reconstructive procedures, second, the direct 
internalization of imitation by images, and third, recall by 
images of objects or events extraneous to the action. In 
summary, there were three hierarchic types of memory, each 
with their sub-levels: recognition memory, reconstruction 
memory, and recall memory. 
Alternative Models 
Cummings and Bjork 
Several investigators have criticized Piaget's theory 
of object permanence. Notable among these are Schuberth 
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1983; Cummings & Bjork 1981; Bower 1967; 1973a; 1973b; 1975; 
and Moore 1978. In his review of The Infant's Research for 
Objects, Schuberth, (1983) suggested three shortcomings of 
Piaget's theory. First, recent data have suggested that the 
AB errors defining the fourth and fifth stages in the 
developmental sequence postulated by Piaget (1954) were 
artifacts of the two-choice search tasks that Piaget 
employed. Another problem attributed to Piaget's (1954) 
theory involved demonstrations of young infants' perception 
of nonchanging properties of objects and their ability to 
mentally represent absent objects. Such demonstrations 
suggested that the theoretical assumptions concerning 
infants' view of the surrounding world were in error 
' (Schuberth, 1983). Finally, Schuberth (1983) suggested that 
there was insufficient consideration given in the theory to 
infants' use of contextual cues in coding the location of 
objects in the environment. The above studies were 
important for evaluating Piaget's theory. This became 
apparent when one considered that it was Piaget's 
observation of the Stage 4 AB error that led him to 
interpret his infants' earlier behaviors toward absent 
objects. Such observations demonstrated their egocentric 
tendencies rather than their objective responses (Piaget, 
1954). 
Cummings and Bjork (1981) argued that infants were 
aware of object permanence and of the systematic nature of 
spatial relations. Their conclusions were based on their 
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findings in studies of infants' search tasks performance in 
five locations. They expanded the argument by saying that 
errors made by infants in searching for hidden objects cquld 
be understood in terms of an information-processing model of 
memory (Cummings & Bjork, 1981). 
The model suggested that infants' search for objects 
can be understood in terms of the processes of encoding, 
storage, and retrieval of stimulus information. Infants 
were capable of locatin~ hidden object even after the object 
was moved to anoth~r location or position (Cummings & Bjork, 
1979). For example, infants were inclined to search for an 
object near or in position A during the first trial 
(Cummings & Bjork, 1979). The infants' tendency to 
continually search at or near A also increased over 
successive hiding trials at A. The same observations 
occurred when the location was changed to B. cummings and 
Bjork (1979) assumed that on the initial trial at A and B, 
infants were capable of encoding the location of the object 
by directing their search to the correct location. This 
ability to encode the location of the object increased over 
successive trials (Cummings & Bjork, 1981). 
Cummings and Bjork's (1981) theory was different from 
Piaget's theory. While Cummings and Bjork (1984) focused on 
infants' ability to encode locations of object on more than 
two locations, Piaget was concerned with providing the 
infant with only two locations to search for a hidden object 
(Cummings and Bjork, 1984). 
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Since search for hidden objects (object permanence) 
requires memory for previous events (Flavell, 1985, p. 210), 
the development of memory is pert1nent to the study of part-
whole relations within the context of object permanence 
Investigators of early memory development often capitalized 
on young children's readiness to search for objects within 
the environment (Deloache, 1985). Cummings and Bjork (1984) 
used the memory hypothesis to predict that search attempts 
of eight- to ten-month old infants should occur at or near 
the object's current location on A or B hiding trials. In 
addition, Sophian (1983) believed that object permanence was 
a useful tool to study infant memory development. 
Information processing approach looks at cognitive 
development as a system from the processing and the storage 
of information (Small, 1990). Though informat1on processing 
has been used to look at how adults process information, 
there is yet to be a model looking at infant cognitive 
development (Small, 1990). According to Howard (1983), 
there are several bases of information processing. First, 
humans process environmental information in stages. Time is 
considered a factor between the occurrence of stimulus and 
the production of a response. Next, information is 
transformed from a visual code to a verbal code. Finally, 
there is a limitation in the amount of information being 
processed each time. 
The composition of Howard's (1983) information 
processing such as sensory registers, short term memory, 
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long term memory, central processor, and response system are 
impertinent to the study of object permanence and infant 
development. It is interesting to investigate which 
aspect(s) of information processing can explain infants' 
successes in their search for the missing body part of the 
doll in this study. 
Bower 
Bower (1967) disregarded the part of Piaget's theory 
that explained difficulties in infants' search behavior as 
being due to the lack of attainment of object permanence. 
Bower (1967) theorized that very young infants (e.g., as 
young as 20 days old), behaved as though they were aware of 
the continued existence of an object that disappeared when 
the object was made to disappear by some means other than by 
covering. Also, the errors that infants made in searching 
for objects in full view resembled the mistakes they made 
when searching for hidden objects (Schuberth, 1983). Bower, 
Broughton, and Moore (1971) indicated in their study that 
infants as young as seven weeks of age may manifest a belief 
in the continued existence of vanished objects, provided 
that infants were given the "appropriate stimulation". This 
theory was considered controversial, and so was rejected by 
theorists such as Piaget (1971}. In the meantime, Bower 
(1979) claimed that young infants used simple search methods 
such as continually looking along the path of an object. At 
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the same time, the infant followed the object visually until 
it stopped (Bower, 1971). 
There were three stages to Bower's theory of how 
infants obtained object permanence. Each stage will be 
discussed in order. In the first stage, Bower and Paterson 
(1973a) studied the development of infants' visual tracking 
of objects. They concluded that infants between the ages of 
four to five months developed accurate visual tracking of 
objects. This behavior would diminish at approximately nine 
to twelve months. Infants during th1s stage displayed two 
character1stic errors in visual tracking behavior. First, 
infants failed to understand that when an object had stopped 
moving along the path, it remained the same object. Infants 
in Bower's (1971) study, however, continued to look along 
the path where the object had previously moved. A second 
error during this stage was concerned with 1nfants' tracking 
behavior of objects that move cyclically. That is, when 
twelve to twenty-four weeks old infants were presented with 
an object that moved from place one to place two, and back 
again, (while stopping at both places), the infants learned 
to track the objects at both places. When place three was 
added to the above, the infants continued to look at the 
object at place two, thus, erring in the search (Bower & 
Paterson, 1973). According to Bower and Paterson (1973), 
both of these behaviors decreased when infants were 
about 23 weeks old. 
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The second stage of development was the transition from 
stage four to stage five of the object concept. Bower and 
Paterson (1973) believed that when infants were in substage 
4, they could retrieve an object that had been hidden under 
a cloth or in a container. If allowed to retrieve the 
object from A more than once, however, infants would 
continue to search for the object at A even when it was 
moved to place B. When infants were in substage five, 
though, they would not commit such an error (Bower & 
Paterson, 1973). 
In the final stage of Bower's (1979) theory of 
development, infants were moving from substage five to 
substage six of object concept. Infants were capable of not 
only searching for objects that were displaced visibly 
(Bower & Paterson, 1973) but also for objects that were 
displaced invisibly. This final stage of development, 
according to Bower and Paterson (1973), resembled Piaget's 
(1952; 1954) development of the fifth and sixth substages of 
sensorimotor and object permanence. 
Moore 
Moore and his associates (1978) expanded Piaget's 
(1954) and Bower's (1971) theories. Moore's theory (1978) 
differed from Piaget's theory in several aspects. First, 
Moore (1978) assumed that the ability to mentally represent 
an object which was no longer in view marked the beg1nning 
rather than the end point, of the developmental sequence in 
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which infants achieved an understanding of object 
permanence. Even though infants could mentally represent 
object that was being hidden, the infants did not understand 
that an object was a permanent entity until they understood 
that an object still maintained its identity when it 
disappeared and then reappeared. 
In contrast to Piaget's (1954) theory, Moore assumed 
that spatial and featural rules for determining object 
identity were the structural elements underlying an 
understanding of object permanence. According to Moore, 
therefore, the development of an understanding that objects 
were permanent was the understanding that an object had an 
identity in and of itself. 
Moore and Meltzoff (1978) came up with three levels in 
determining the development of object identity. The first 
level encompassed ages zero to four months, and it is 
characterized by rules for the solution of identity problems 
associated with the steady structure of the visual world. 
In other words, moving objects continued to move and resting 
objects continued to rest. Infants during this stage could 
determine that the identity of the moving object was the 
same at any point on its path and that the identity of an 
object at a particular point in time remained the same. 
Five to eight month old infants were included 1n level 
two, which was associated with the solution of identity 
problems associated with changes in the steady state 
structure of the visual world. An infant, for example, 
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could determine that the moving object, while it became 
stationary, was the same object (Moore and Meltzoff, 1978). 
Infants in level three were eight to ten months old. During 
this phase, infants employed rules for determining the 
identity of visible objects throughout transformations that 
rendered the objects temporarily invisible, (e.g., the 
object that was being covered by a moving screen or the 
moving object that disappeared behind the stationary screen 
(Moore and Meltzoff, 1978). 
Memory 
Watson 
Watson (1984) distinguished between three levels of 
memory development in infancy, First, reactive memory 
occurred if one sensed that an experience was one that had 
occurred on some previous occasion as opposed to a novel 
experience. Second, reactive memory corresponded with 
Piaget's recognition memory in defin1tion (Piaget & 
Inhelder, 1973; Sophian, 1983). Finally, regenerative 
memory took place 1f present experience was altered so that 
either stimulus structure or behavioral content was affected 
in such a way as to share some features with any past 
experience. An example would be infants' imitation and 
search for hidden objects (Sophian, 1983). Regenerative 
memory was comparable to Piaget's and' Inhelder's (1973) 
reconstructive memory. Finally, associative memory was the 
27 
joining of two or more memories of different experiences 
occurring at different points in time. It was somewhat 
similar to Piaget's and Inhelder's {1973) recall memory. 
Associative memory entailed the activation of memory not 
only for that event but also for an associated, but not 
absent, event {Sophian, 1983). According to Watson, each of 
the three categories could benefit from further 
classification into either short term memory (i.e., a few 
seconds) or to long-term memory {i.e .. , more than a few 
minutes). With current literature available on infant 
memory, Watson {1984) concluded that there was evidence that 
human infants displayed memory capacity in each of the 
categories, and that the developmental picture varied from 
one category to another. 
As mentioned previously, infant memory development is 
pertinent to the study of part-whole relations within the 
context of object permanence. Hopefully, the present study 
concerning part-whole relations and object permanence will 
clarify which form of memories infants utilize in the 
retrieval of the dismembered parts of a doll. 
CHAPTER III 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
To understand how the budding intelligence 
constructs the external world, we must first 
ask whether the child, in its first months of 
life, conceives and perceives things as we 
do, as objects that have substance, that are 
permanent and of constant dimensions. If this 
is not the case, it is then necessary to explain 
how the idea of an object (object concept) is 
built up (Piaget, 1954, p. 3) 
Object Permanence 
There is an abundance of research on the concept of 
object permanence (Flavell, 1985; Harris, 1975; and Sophian, 
1983). It has been widely documented that object permanence 
is attainable when the infants are about nine-months old. 
Several studies, however, have challenged Piaget's (1954) 
theory, by noting that object permanence can be shown in 
much younger infants. Among the studies challenging 
Piaget's (1954) concept are studies by Baillargeon (1985; 
1987), Bower and associates (1967; 1973a; 1973b; 1975), and 
Hood and Willats (1986). 
Baillargeon (1985) tested five-month old infants by 
letting them habituate (i.e., visually attending) to a 
screen that moves back and forth in a 180 degree arc, like a 
drawbridge. After infants reached habituation, a box was 
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put behind the screen. The infants were later tested on the 
possible event, where the screen stopped when it reached the 
occluded box, and the impossible event, where the screen 
moved through space occupied by the box. Results indicated 
that the infants looked longer at the impossible event. 
Hence, the investigator postulated that the attainment of 
object concept had occurred (Baillargeon, 1985). A similar 
study by Baillargeon (1987) with three- and a-half and four-
and a-half month infants showed the same results. 
Bower and Wishart (1972) used another approach to 
challenge Piaget's theory. They tested a group of five-
month old infants with an object suspended on a string, 
which was within reaching distance. The room lights were 
turned off, leaving the infant in darkness for approximately 
three minutes. It was reported that these infants reached 
out to grasp the object in the dark, and that reaching 
behavior was accurate (Bower & Wishart, 1972). A similar 
study by Wishart, Bower, and Dunkeld (1978) replicated 
Bower's previous study. Other studies by Bower, Broughton, 
and Moore (1971) found that infants of 20 weeks old were 
able to anticipate when the object was to reappear, should 
the object be moved out of sight. Bower et al, (1971) 
claimed that object permanence was attainable prior to Stage 
IV (about nine months) when infants were tested on visual 
tracking behavior, rather than trad1tional manual search 
behavior (Bower, 1972). In fact, Bower, Broughton, and 
Moore (1971); Bower and Paterson, (1972; 1973b) and Hood and 
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Willats (1986) all indicated that young infants, (i.e., 
about 16 weeks old), manifested notions of object permanence 
in visual tracking when the lights in the room were 
extinguished, as infants reached out for the object(s). 
The above studies indicated that infants younger than 
nine months-old had not.ions of object permanence, as 
evidenced in their visual tracking behavior. There were 
studies, however, that disputed these studies. Moore, 
Borton, & Darby (1978) tested five to nine-month old infants 
to determine if the infants would anticipate the 
reappearance of an object disappearing behind a screen. 
They found that five-month old infants showed disruptions of 
visual tracking, therefore, challenging Bower and 
associates' (1967; 1971; 1972; 1973a; 1973b; 1975) findings 
that younger infants understood object concept. Other 
studies failed to replicate the results of Bower et al 
(1967; 1971; 1972; 1973a; 1973b; 1975) Baillargeon (1985; 
1987), while Hood & Willats' (1986) study of infants' visual 
tracking showed that infants had mastered the concept of 
object permanence. Goldberg (1976), in her study of 36 
infants aged twenty to twenty-f,~ur weeks, used visual 
fixation and cardiac deceleration to assess the status of 
three kinds of events in which objects moving on a linear 
trajectory were temporarily occluded by a screen. 
Goldberg's (1976) rationale for using cardiac deceleration 
suggested that these were sometimes more sensitive in 
discriminating infant's visual tracking behavior than visual 
31 
fixation. The results of her study failed to demonstrate 
existence constancy or object permanence in five-months old 
infants. Muller and Aslin {1978) extended the findings from 
past object tracking experiments by looking at infants' 
spontaneous visual tracking experiments and the disruptions 
in that tracking behavior. They did not find any indication 
in their study that infants at age two, four, and six months 
old were able to attain stage IV searching behavior. 
In summary, the use of visual tracking as a measure of 
object permanence in infants younger than nine months old 
could not be duplicated in the studies mentioned (Goldberg, 
1976; Moore, Borton, & Darby, 1978; Muller & Aslin, 1978). 
Stage IV Search Error 
Probably, according to Horobin and Acredolo {1986), the 
stage IV search error was the most frequently researched 
finding in Piaget's {1952; 1954) stages of sensorimotor 
development. Infants at substage IV, that is between eight 
to twelve months, were able to retrieve an object hidden 
within reach at one location {A). If the same object was 
visibly moved to location (B), the infants would commit what 
Piaget {1954) called the AB error. According to Horobin and 
Acredolo {1986), infants erred in search because of 
"profound egocentrism". During this stage infants had a 
subjective conception of objects, position, and movement, 
which was conceived relative to the infant's own body and 
action, and infants would continuously search at location A 
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even when they saw the object moved to a different location 
(B) (Horobin and Acredolo, 1986). 
In their findings, Horobin and Acredolo (1986) reported 
that visual attentiveness was a determinant of whether or 
not infants would successfully retrieve hidden objects. 
Perseverative errors were most likely to occur when the 
hiding locations were close together as infants may have 
trouble perceptively discriminating these. However, in 
Piaget's (1954) theory, when children acquired knowledge of 
the external world through actions, the occurrence of AB 
search errors was considered critical evidence that infants 
were egocentrically concerned with their own actions. The 
infants, therefore, did not comprehend the systematic nature 
of spatial relationships or the concept of object permanence 
(Bjork & Cummings, 1984). 
Lingle & Lingle (1978), in investigating the influence 
of familiarity and motivational factors on eight to 
thirteenth-month old infants' search behavior, found that 
infants' search for familiar or attached objects on the AB 
locations were insignificant. According to the 
investigators, infants' successes on search behavior were 
best explained by motivational factors (Lingle & Lingle, 
1978). 
Sophian and Sage (1985) examined perseverative errors 
and the ability to select between conflicting sources of 
information of 20 nine-month old infants and 15 sixteenth-
month old infants by using 1dentical location conditions and 
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distinctive locations. The nine-month old infants 
perseverated more significantly in three choice hiding 
places (Sophian & Sage, 1985). They also made more errors 
in selecting inappropriately between the conflicting sources 
of information by relying more on prior information (A 
location) when current information (B location) was 
available (Sophian & Sage, 1985). 
Harris (1973) found that if there was a delay prior to 
allowing infants to search for the hidden object, the 
infants were more likely to make the A, not B error. 
Similar findings were reported in Horobin and Acredolo 
(1986) where they looked at infants' attentive behavior 
prior to searching for the object (Gratch, et al, 1984; 
Webb, Massar, & Nadolny, 1972). Besides studies showing 
that perseverative errors were likely to occur when there 
was a delay before the actual search, Butterworth (1975) 
reported that if the object was hidden away from the 
infant's midline, AB error was likely to occur as well. 
Whether infants in the present study are likely to make the 
AB error in the event of searching for the hidden parts of 
the doll when the object/parts are hidden away from the 
infants' midline remains to be seen. 
Infant's Part-Whole Perception 
Few studies in part-whole relations with infants have 
been conducted. With the exception of studies on part-whole 
perceptions described above, one study by Shafaie, Self, and 
Allen (paper presented, 1984) used infants as their 
subjects. 
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In this study, Shafaie, Self and Allen (1984) looked at 
memory processes during infancy. They found age differences 
in infants' search and affective behavior. Older infants 
tended to search actively for the missing part of the object 
and the success rate for this group of infants was much 
higher than the younger group of infants (Shafaie, Self, & 
I 
Allen, 1984). 
Conclusions 
Object permanence has indeed generated considerable 
research, particularly at stage IV of Piaget's (1952) 
sensorimotor development (Horobin & Acredolo, 1986; Sophian 
& Sage, 1985). studies have shown the controversial nature 
of Stage IV perseverative or AB error. Another area that 
generated controversial results was the use of visual 
tracking of an object as a means of proving that infants had 
developed object permanence (Baillargeon, 1985; 1986; 1987; 
Bower & associates, 1967; 1973a; 1973b; 1975; Hood & 
Willats, 1986). This theory was rejected by several 
researchers. Little research has been done on the part-
whole relations within object permanence. The present 
research, therefore, proposed to look at the affective and 
search behavior of infants between the ages of nine to 24-
months in relation to the development of obJect permanence 
and part-whole relations, which are parts of cognitive 
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development. The present research attempted to relate the 
importance of part-whole relations and infant memory 
development within the context of object permanence. To 
fulfill this ambition, the investigator used the methodology 
of Shafie, Self, & Allen (1984) to this neglected aspect of 
object permanence. 
CHAPTER IV 
HYPOTHESES 
The purpose of the present study was to examine the 
search behavior and affective responses of infants between 
the ages of nine to twenty-four months to further understand 
the relationships of object permanence , part-whole 
relations, and infant memory development. A variety of 
behavioral measures were used: Visual and manual search 
behavior, latency to search, as well as affective behaviors. 
Uzgiris and Hunt (1975; 1989) described object permanence as 
"infant's reaction to an object disappearing from view 
changes from one end of turning his gaze immediately from 
the point of disappearance to one of holding his gaze at the 
point of disappearance until the object returns". The 
change implies an increasing stability of those central 
processes through which the infant apprehends the object 
which mediate what Piaget (1954) calls 'object permanence'. 
Infants' cognitive levels for this study were 
determined prior to the part-whole tasks by using Uzgiris 
and Hunt's object permanence scale. 
The following hypotheses were explored based on the 
review of the literature in this study. 
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1. There will be no effect on gender on measures of object 
permanence (cognitive level). 
2. There will be no differences in latency to visual 
search on the change tasks as a function of cognitive level 
3. There will be no differences in visual search on the 
change tasks as a function of cognitive level. 
4. There will be no differences in latency to manual 
search on the change tasks as a function of cognitive level. 
5. There will be no differences in manual search on the 
change tasks as a function of cognitive level. 
6. There will be no differences in affect on the change 
tasks as a function of cognitive level. 
7. There will be no differences in latency to visual 
search on the change tasks as a function of salience of the 
missing part of the object. 
8. There will be no differences in visual search on the 
change tasks as a function of salience of the missing part 
of the object. 
9. There will be no differences in latency to manual 
search on the change as a function of salience of the 
missing part of the object. 
10. There will be no differences in manual search on the 
change tasks as a function of salience of the missing part 
of the object. 
11. There will be no differences in affect on the change 
tasks as a function of salience of the missing part of the 
object. 
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12. There will be no differences in latency to visual 
search on the change tasks as a function of the interaction 
of cognitive level and salience of the missing part of the 
object. 
13. There will be no differences in visual search on the 
change tasks as a function of the interaction of cognitive 
level and salience of the missing part of the object. 
14. There will be no differences in latency to manual 
search on the change tasks as a function of the interaction 
of cognitive level and salience of the missing part of the 
object. 
15. There will be no differences in manual search on the 
change tasks as a function of the interaction of cogn1tive 
level and salience of the missing part of the object. 
16. There will be no differences in affect on the change 
tasks as a function of the interaction of cognitive level 
and salience of the missing part of the object. 
CHAPTER V 
METHODOLOGY 
Infants who participated in this investigation were 
solicited from day care centers in a medium agricultural 
university town in the south west. Additional infants were 
solicited from day care centers in a larger city about 60 
miles south of the university city. The infants were 
videotaped playing with the experimenter in a non-
threatening, familiar room, such as, a small group room in 
the day care center. 
Subjects 
Infants between the ages of nine to twenty-four months 
(sixteen in each of the cognitive levels of four, five, and 
six) participated in the present study. An equal sample of 
male and female subjects participated in this study. The 
mean age for male infants for cognitive level four was 
10.38, the mean age for female infants for cognitive level 
four was 10.63. The mean age for male infants for cognitive 
level five was 16.63 and the mean age for female infants was 
15.63. Finally, the mean age for male infants for cognitive 
level six was 22.13 and 22.50 for the female infants (see 
Table II). 
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Stimuli 
The following stimuli were used during the tasks. 
1. A non-sexist doll approximately six inches in length 
with removable parts 
2. A smaller doll approximately 3.5" in length with 
nonremovable parts. 
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3. Two small covers, one white non-transparent felt cloth 
about 18" by 18", and one blue non-transparent felt cloth 
were used. 
4. A pillow about 12" by 12" was used for multiple 
displacements. 
5. A small box of about 4.5" by 4.5" was used to hide the 
smaller doll for invisible displacement tasks. 
Measures 
Though Piaget (1954) never intended to use his theory 
of sensorimotor development as an assessment of early 
cognitive competencies (Dunst, 1982), it has been used 
widely to assess cognitive development of infants. Casati 
Lezine (1968), Escalona and Corman (1966), and Uzgir1s and 
Hunt (1975; 1989) have used Piaget's (1954) theory as a 
framework in constructing their versions of ordinal scales 
of infant psychological development (Dunst, 1982). 
By far the most comprehensive work on Piagetian Scales 
has been compiled by Uzgiris and Hunt (Dunst, 1982). These 
scales, known as Infant Psychological Development Scale 
(IPDS), measure seven related areas in infant development: 
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{1) visual pursuit and object permanence; {2) the 
development of means and obtaining desired environmental 
events; {3a) the development of vocal imitation; (3b) the 
development of gestural imitation; (4) the development of 
operational causality; (5) the construction of object 
relations in space; (6) the development of schemes for 
relating to objects. For the purpose of this study, the 
investigator used Uzgiris and Hunt's {1975;1989) version of 
visual pursuit and object permanence as a measure of object 
permanence. 
For scoring purposes in this study, a numerical system 
will be given to the response for eliciting behaviors for 
the tasks. For both manual and visual search, a {1) will be 
given for no detection; (2) will be for possible detection; 
(3) skepticism, puzzlement, possible search after a period 
of time; (4) possible or chance search; (5) definite search; 
{6) active search but not found; and (7) actively searched 
and found the missing part. 
Affect 
Charlesworth's (1969) level of surprise procedure will 
be used to look at the infant's affective behavior. It is 
expected that the dismembered doll will elicit an observable 
surprise reaction, the infant should react to a changed 
stimulus with a strong orienting reflex accompanied by an 
arresting of gross motor behavior. This should immediately 
follow at times by changes in facial expression and posture 
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{Charlesworth, 1969. p. 280). The following scoring system 
is adapted for this study. 
1. There is no change in the infant's affect. That 
is, upon retrieving the dismembered doll, infants' affect 
remain 'emotionless'. The investigator and her rater are 
unable to observe raised eyebrows; wide opened eyes; 
roundish mouth among the infants. There is no indication 
that infants are even aware that the doll has a body part 
missing. 
2. There is some puzzlement in the infant's affect. 
For example, infants, upon retrieving the dismembered doll, 
are aware that the same doll has a part missing. Instead of 
showing total surprise with raised eyebrows; wide-opened 
eyes; and roundish mouth, infants show only partial 
puzzlement with their affect by raising only the eyebrows or 
creasing their eyebrows. 
3. There is marked puzzlement or surprise with the 
infant's affect. For example, infants' eyebrows are raised 
accompanied by wide-opened eyes and roundish mouth after 
they have retrieved the doll and have discovered that the 
doll has a body part missing. 
Interrater reliability 
A rater who was blind to the study was trained to code 
the data. The rater was told to look for infants' facial 
expressions when they retrieved the dismembered doll from 
under the cover. For example, if infants were surprised, 
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they would raised their eyebrows, followed by wide-opened 
eyes, and roundish mouth. When infants elicited the above 
emotions, they were given a score of three for affective 
response. A score of two was given when infants showed only 
partial surprise by raising only their eyebrows or opening 
their mouth. A score of one was scored when infants did not 
elicit any emotions or when they showed no interests in the 
dismembered doll. 
Overall reliability for visual search, manual search, 
and affect for all forty-eight infants was 94%. Interrater 
reliability for visual search was 91.44% (with a range of 
50% to 100%). For manual search, the interrater reliability 
was 91.30% (with a range of 50% to 100%). Finally, 
interrater reliability for affect was 89.57% with a range of 
(50% to 100%). 
Procedure 
Following obtaining parental consent, infants were 
brought to a familiar room in their respective day care 
centers to be videotaped playing with the investigator. For 
the first task, that is the standard object permanence task, 
each infant was allowed to play with the smaller doll for 
approximately 60 seconds. Each infant was given three 
trials on the standard object permanence tasks. That is, 
the investigator would hide the doll under a white, non-
transparent cloth in full view of the infants. The 
investigator then would ask the infants to search for the 
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hidden doll each time. This was to determine that success 
in obtaining the hidden doll was the result of the infants' 
understanding that the doll had disappeared from their view. 
This is also the criteria for scoring infants' success with 
the object permanence tasks (Uzgiris & Hunt, 1975; 1989). 
Following the standard object permanence task, the 
investigator tested each infant with three more trials of AB 
error tasks, alternate AB error tasks, superimposed three 
obstacles tasks, invisible displacement task with one 
screen, and finally, invisible displacement tasks with two 
screens. These tasks were taken from Uzgiris and Hunt's 
(1975; 1989) infant assessments scale and used to determine 
infants' cognitive levels with object permanence tasks. 
Infants at cognitive level four were successful with the 
standard object permanence tasks but erred in the AB error 
tasks. Subsequently, in this study, infants who failed AB 
error tasks and alternate AB error tasks more than once were 
not tested further with superimposed three obstacle tasks, 
invisible displacement tasks with one and two screens. 
Sixteen infants in this study were at cognitive level four. 
This was based on their performances with the above 
mentioned tasks. 
Infants at cognitive level five must succeed at least 
twice in retrieving the doll in AB error tasks, alternate AB 
error tasks, superimposed three obstacles tasks. Eighteen 
infants (eight males and ten females) fit into this 
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category. Two females were later dropped from the study to 
comply with having equal sample of the subjects. 
Infants at cognitive level six succeeded at least twice 
in invisible displacement of tasks with one or two screens 
besides the preceding object permanence tasks mentioned. 
Nineteen infants (eleven males and eight females) succeeded 
in all the tasks mentioned. Three males were later dropped 
from the study. 
After these tasks, the part-whole tasks were given. 
The investigator partially hid the non-sexist doll under a 
cover exposing only the parts of the body that were not 
detached. The investigator then dismembered the arm or the 
leg of the doll. The first two tasks involved the 
dismembering of either the arm or the leg of the doll 
randomly. After dismemberment of the arm or the leg, the 
investigator asked the infants to look for the doll. The 
final part-whole task involved the dismembering of the 
doll's head. Pilot work indicated the level of surprise in 
the infant to be overpowering when the head was removed. 
Once again, infants were asked to look for the doll. The 
infants were given two trials for each part-whole task. The 
whole procedure was videotaped and lasted between five to 
fifteen minutes. Affect was measured as level of surprise 
on a scale of 1, 2, or 3 for each arm, leg, and head. 
For scoring of visual search and manual search, a score 
of one to seven was given with {1) indicating no visual 
search or manual search and (7) indicating full visual 
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search or full manual search. Latency to visual search and 
latency to manual search were timed according to how long 
the infant took to begin to search for the missing part of 
the doll. Affect of the infant was also scored after each 
trial {total six trials in all). A score of 1 was given for 
no visible affect, and a 3 was given for surprise or total 
puzzlement. 
CHAPTER VI 
RESULTS 
Several analyses were carried out with the data 
obtained from infants in cognitive levels four, five, and 
six in this study. Cognitive levels for these infants were 
determined with object permanence tasks given prior to part-
whole tasks. Of these, many were significant. The 
following paragraphs examine the various results concerning 
latency to visual search, amount of visual search, latency 
to manual search, amount of manual search, and affect. 
Preliminary Analyses 
For the preliminary analysis examining the impact of 
gender, an analysis of variance indicated there was no 
significant difference as a function of gender on the object 
permanence tasks (F = 0.5928; p < 0.4453). The means for 
gender were as follows: Male= 101.6667, female= 97.7500. 
As such, gender was ignored in the other analyses. These 
results are shown in Table I. 
(Insert Table I about here) 
The primary analyses used cognitive level and salience 
of the missing body parts as independent variables. The 
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dependent variable dependent variables, depending on the 
analysis, included visual search, latency to visual search, 
manual search, latency to manual search, and affect. Three 
by three (cognitive level by salience of the missing body 
parts) repeated measures analyses of variance were used to 
examine the impact of cognitive level and salience on the 
various means. Post hoc Scheffe's tests were used when 
necessary to determine which groups accounted for the 
significant difference. 
Primary Analyses 
Latency to visual search 
A repeated measures analyses of variance {3 x 3) 
examining cognitive level and salience of the missing body 
part revealed cognitive level to account for significant 
differences in latency to visual search (F = 55.11, p < 
0.0001) (Table II). The means were as follows: For 
cognitive level four = 198.3958, cognitive level five = 
96.3333, and cognitive level six= 42.0000) {Table III). 
Follow up Scheffe's tests revealed that the means for only 
cognitive levels five and six were significantly;different 
{F = 2.02; 2-tailed p < 0.018) {Table IV). 
(Insert Tables II, III, and IV about here) 
Salience of the missing body part of the object showed 
no significant effects on latency to visual search {F = 
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1.64, p < 0.1977) {Table V). The mean scores for the 
various body parts were as follows: Arm = 126.8958, leg = 
110.0833, and head= 99.7500) {Table VI). No significant 
difference was revealed for the interaction effect of 
cognitive level and salience of the missing body part for 
latency to visual search {F = 0.71, p < 0.5841). {Table V). 
As for latency to visual search, infants took the 
longest time (in seconds) to realize that the arm was 
missing, followed by the leg, and then the head. It took 
infants in all three cognitive levels an average of 126.8958 
seconds to visually searched for the missing arm, 110.0833 
to visually searched for the missing leg, and 99.7500 
seconds to visually searched for the missing head. {Table 
VI). 
(Insert Tables IV, V, and VI about here) 
Amount of visual search 
Repeated analyses of variance {3 x 3) with cognitive 
level and salience of the missing body part revealed 
cognitive level was significant in accounting for in the 
amount of visual search {F = 62.25, p < 0.0001) {Table V). 
The means were as follows: For cognitive level four = 
4.7292, cognitive level five= 11.0625, and cognitive level 
six= 13.1042) (see Table III). Post hoc Scheffe's tests 
located the significant differences between children of 
cognitive levels four and six {F = 2.71; 2-tailed p < 0.001) 
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and between children of cognitive levels five and six (F = 
3.15; 2-tailed p < 0.000) (Table IV). 
This analysis also showed no significant differences as 
a result of the salience of the missing body parts of the 
doll (F = 0.57, p < 0.5677) (Table V). The means for 
missing body parts were as follows: Arm = 9.2292, leg 2 = 
9.6042, and head= 10.0625 (Table VI). 
There was no significant difference for the interaction 
effect of visual search by cognitive level and salience of 
the body part (F = 0.32, p < 0.8637). 
Latency to manual search 
Similar to previous variables, this repeated measures 
analysis used cognitive level and salience of the missing 
part to measure latency to manual search. 
Result of this analysis showed a significant difference 
for latency to manual search by cognitive level (F = 51.11; 
p < 0.0001) (Table V). The means for cognitive levels were 
as follows: Cognitive level four= 197.9167, cognitive 
level five= 82.1667, and cognitive level six= 35.0625 
(Table III). Follow up Post hoc Scheffe's test revealed a 
significant difference among cognitive levels'five and six 
(F = 1.78, p < 0.50) (Table IV). 
There was no significant difference in latency to 
manual search by salience of the missing body part of the 
doll (F = 1.13, p < 0.3277) (Table V). The means for 
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missing body parts were as follows: Arm= 119.0417, leg= 
100.8333, and head= 95.2708 (Table IV). 
Results showed no significant interaction in latency to 
manual search by cognitive level and salience of the body 
part (F = 0.66, p < 0.6203) (Table V). The infants 
performed slightly better in their latency to manual search 
for the three missing body parts. Infants took 
approximately 119.0417 seconds to manually searched for the 
arm, 100.8333 seconds to manually searched for the leg, and 
95.2708 seconds to manually searched for the head (Table 
VI). 
Amount of manual search 
Once again, the repeated measures analysis (3 x 3) used 
cognitive level and salience of the missing body part to 
measure the amount of manual search. 
The analysis revealed differences in the amount of 
manual search by cognitive level to be significantly 
different (F = 61.80; p < 0.0001) (Table V). The means for 
cognitive levels were as follows: Cognitive level four = 
4.7291, cognitive level five= 11.0625, and cognitive level 
six = 13.0833 (Table III) when repeated analyses of variance 
was used to examine the result. Further Post hoc Scheffe's 
test revealed a significant difference among cognitive 
levels four and six (F = 2.65; p < 0.001) and cognitive 
levels five and six (F = 3.07; p < 0.000) (Table IV). 
There was no significant difference in the amount of 
manual search by salience of the missing body part of the 
doll (F = 0.59, p < 0.5533) (Table V). The means for 
missing body parts were as follows: arm = 9.2083, leg = 
9.6042, and head= 10.0625) (Table VI). 
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The interaction of cognitive level and salience of the 
missing body parts did not significantly affect the amount 
of manual search (F = 0.31, p < 0.8695) (Table V). 
Affect 
The repeated measures analysis (3 x 3) for affect 
showed a significant difference by cognitive level (F = 
59.82; p < 0.0001) (Table V). The means for cognitive 
levels were as follows: Cognitive level four = 2.3333, 
cognitive level five = 3.8333, and cognitive level six= 
4.9583 (Table III). Further Post hoc Scheffe's test 
revealed the significant differences among cognitive levels 
four and five (F = 2.85; p < 0.000) and cognitive levels 
four and six (F = 1.96; p < 0.023) (Table IV). 
There was a significant difference of the ma1n effect 
for affect by salience of the missing body parts of the doll 
(F = 5.57, p < 0.0047) (Table V). The means for the missing 
body parts were as follows: Arm= 3.4167, leg= 3.5417, and 
head= 4.1667) (Table VI). Post hoc Scheffe's test did not 
indicate which missing body part elicited more affective 
responses from the infants. 
There was not a significant interaction of cognitive 
level and salience of the missing body part on affect 
(F = 1.77, p < 0.1377). Table V shows these means. 
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TABLE I 
MEAN SCORES FOR GENDER ON OBJECT PERMANENCE TASKS 
Group 
Male 
Female 
N 
24 
24 
Mean 
101.6667 
97.7500 
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TABLE II 
MEAN AGE BY GENDER AND COGNITIVE LEVEL 
COGNITIVE LEVELS 
GENDER 4* 5* 6* 
Male 10.38 16.63 22.13 
Female 10.63 15.63 22.50 
*4 (Age is approximately between 8 to 12 months) 
*5 (Age is approximately between 13 to 17 months) 
*6 (Age is approximately between 18 to 24 months) 
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TABLE III 
MEAN SCORES BY COGNITIVE LEVELS 
VARIABLES 4 5 6 
Amount of Visual search 4.7292 11.0625 13.1042 
Latency to visual search 198.3958 96.3333 42.0000 
Amount of Manual search 4.7292 11.0625 13.0833 
Latency to manual search 197.9167 82.1667 35.0625 
Affect 2.3333 3.8333 4.9583 
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TABLE IV 
POST HOC SCHEFFE'S 
Cognitive Levels Four and six 
F Pr < F 
Visual Search 2.71 0.001* 
Latency to Visual Search 1.46 0.198 
Manual Search 2.65 0.001* 
Latency to Manual Search 1.16 0.618 
Affect 1.96 0.023* 
cognitive Levels Four and Five 
Visual Search 1.16 0.614 
Latency to Visual Search 1. 38 0.268 
Manual Search 1.16 0.614 
Latency to Manual Search 1.54 0.143 
Affect 2.85 0.000* 
Cognitive Levels Five and Six 
Visual Search 3.15 0.000* 
Latency to Visual Search 2.08 0.018* 
Manual Search 3.07 0.000* 
Latency to Manual Search 1.78 0.050* 
Affect 1.46 0.202 
*Sign1ficant at 0.05 level. 
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TABLE V 
RESULTS OF ANALYSES OF VARIANCE 
VISUAL SEARCH DF F PR < F 
COGNITIVE LEVELS 2 62.25 0.0001* 
SALIENCE 2 0.57 0.5677 
COGNITIVE LEVEL X SALIENCE 4 0.32 0.8637 
LATENCY TO VISUAL SEARCH 
COGNITIVE LEVELS 2 55.11 0.0001* 
SALIENCE 2 1. 64 0.1977 
COGNITIVE LEVEL X SALIENCE 4 0.71 0.5841 
MANUAL SEARCH 
COGNITIVE LEVELS 2 61.80 0.0001* 
SALIENCE 2 0.59 0.5533 
COGNITIVE LEVEL X SALIENCE 4 0.31 0.8695 
LATENCY TO MANUAL SEARCH 
COGNITIVE LEVELS 2 51.11 0.0001* 
SALIENCE 2 1.13 0.3277 
COGNITIVE LEVEL X SALIENCE 4 0.66 0.6203 
AFFECT 
COGNITIVE LEVELS 2 59.82 0.0001* 
SALIENCE 2 5.57 0.0047 
COGNITIVE LEVEL X SALIENCE 4 1. 77 0.1377 
*Significant at 0.05 level 
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TABLE VI 
MEANS BY SALIENCE OF BODY PARTS 
VARIABLES 1 (ARM) 2(LEG) 3 (HEAD) 
Amount of Visual search 9.2292 9.6042 10.0625 
Latency to visual search 126.8958 110.0833 99.7500 
Amount of Manual search 9.2083 9.6042 10.0625 
Latency to manual search 119.0417 100.8333 95.2708 
Affect 3.4167 3.5417 4.1667 
CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
This study explored the relationships of object 
permanence, part-whole relations, and infant memory 
development. It was anticipated that cognitive level and 
salience of a missing part of an object would alter the 
child's performance on part-whole tasks. While the results 
yielded unequivocal support for the importance of cognitive 
level on the tasks, salience of the missing parts of the 
object only seemed important for affective responsiveness. 
In addition, there were no significant interaction effects 
between cognitive level and salience of the missing part. 
The initial hypothesis concerned the impact of gender 
on cognitive level. No gender differences were found in the 
performance of the boys and girls on the various Uzgiris and 
Hunt's tasks in this study. These results confirmed the 
data from other studies that reported no gender differences 
on object permanence tasks (Cummings & Bjork, 1982; Shafie, 
Self & Allen, 1984). 
The next hypotheses examined the impact of cognitive 
level on the various measures. In each of these analyses, 
cognitive level of the child significantly affected the 
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outcome. For the amount of visual and manual search, 
latency to visual and manual search, and affect, cognitive 
level was a significant factor in performance. Mean scores 
in this study indicated that infants and toddlers differed 
significantly in their performances on part-whole tasks. 
These findings are consistent with Piaget's (1954) 
claim that children in cognitive level six have the capacity 
for mental representation within the sensorimotor stages. 
Piaget (1954) based this statement on the observation that 
infants were able to search for objects through invisible 
displacements only after demonstrating their abilities to 
search for visible d1splacements of objects. Th1s theory 
was further substantiated by Ramsay and Campos' (1978) study 
looking at infants' performance in two search tasks. They 
found that infants' ability to mental representation was 
related to their entering substage six of Piaget's object 
permanence development. Piaget (1954) however, did not 
mention that children younger than cognitive level six were 
also capable of mental representation (Ramsay & Campos. 
1978; 1979). There are studies showing infants younger than 
substage six also had the capacity to mental representation 
(Baillargeon, Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985; Baillargeon, 1986; 
Baillargeon, & Graber, 1987; Bower, 1967; 1975; Bower & 
Paterson, 1973a; 1973b; LeCompte and Gratch, 1972; Ramsay 
and Campos, 1975). 
Infants and toddlers in this study of part-whole 
relations at cognitive level six did remarkably well in the 
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tasks specified. They were more successful in searching for 
the missing body parts of the doll. In the visual and 
manual search tasks, children in cognitive level six scored 
higher in their search for the different missing parts of 
the doll. For latency to visual and manual search, children 
in cognitive levels five and six took less time (in seconds) 
to successfully retrieve the missing body parts. Several 
infants, after recovering the missing body parts, attempted 
on their own to put the parts together. Failing to succeed, 
they gave the doll and the body part to the investigator. 
The shortest time taken for infants in cognitive levels five 
and six to search for the missing body parts was 1 second 
and the longest time taken was 50 seconds. In this study, 
infants at cognitive levels five and six demonstrated their 
abilities to search for the missing body parts of the doll 
that was displaced visibly first followed by their success 
in searching for the missing body part that was displaced 
invisibly. In this study, infants in cognitive level five 
showed mental representation of the doll even though 
according to Piaget (1954); and Ramsay & Campos (1978; 1979) 
only cognitive level six infants were capable to search 
successfully for objects that were displaced invisibly. 
Perhaps other part-whole relations tasks can be studied 
using invisible displacements of a doll with body parts 
missing. 
Infants in cognitive levels five and six were more 
active in their search for the missing body part. Upon 
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retrieving the doll from under the cover and realizing the 
difference, infants at cognitive levels five and six 
immediately searched for the missing body part. Most of the 
older infants were able to remove the cover to look for the 
missing body part. Some of the infants looked at the 
investigator wondering if she kept the missing body part. 
Others searched under the table, looked behind themselves, 
looked at the cover, and then lifted the cover to find the 
missing body part. One infant searched for the missing body 
part by persistently searching in her pockets. Infants in 
cognitive levels five and six, besides succeeded more in the 
visual and manual search behavior, also revealed more 
surprise and puzzlement upon retrieving the incomplete 
object from under the cover. 
On the other hand, infants in cognitive level four 
scored lower on the v1sual and manual search tasks. Most of 
the infants at this level did not successfully search for 
the missing body parts in this study. That is, after 
retrieving the doll from under the cover, the infants in 
cognitive level four, instead of searching for the missing 
body parts, spent more time looking at the doll, returning 
their gaze to the cover and then back at the investigator. 
Infants at this level also spent more time mouthing the 
doll. It never occurred for these infants to search for the 
missing body parts of the doll directly under the cover 
since the doll was displaced visibly prior to the 
64 
dismembering of the body part. After which the investigator 
dismembered the body part invisibly under the cover. 
The infants had about 60 seconds to play with the doll 
before visible displacement and dismemberment of the doll 
occurred. Maybe the time given for these younger infants to 
become familiarized with the doll was insufficient. It was 
clear to the infants at cognitive level four as measured by 
the affect scores that something was definitely different 
about the doll they had retrieved. 
Another possible explanation could be that the part-
whole tasks were simply too difficult for these infants. 
Infants at cognitive level four had difficulty remembering 
that the limb of the doll were all attached together prior 
to having the limbs detached from the doll. Possibly the 
doll used in this task was small and may have failed to 
generate interest from these infants. 
As for the affective response scores in this study, 
infants in all three cognitive levels were significantly 
different. Children in cognitive level six scored 
significantly higher in the means for affective response 
than the other two cognitive levels. Means for affective 
response for cognitive level six is 4.9583; cognitive level 
five is 3.8333, and cognitive level four is 2.3333. The 
affective response scores for cognitive level six explained 
that these infants were more aware of the transformation of 
the object and were able to manifest their emotions 
following retrieval of the incomplete object. Ramsay and 
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Campos (1978; 1979) in determining the relation between 
particular behaviors in infants by using the surprise 
paradigm to measure infants' smiling responses found out in 
their study that infants at cognitive level four showed 
significant affective responses. Similar findings recorded 
in another study (Ramsay & Campos, 1979) supported the 
relationship between cognitive level and infants' surprise 
responses. 
Hiatt, Campos, and Emde (1979) investigated the facial 
expressions and discrete emotional states of infants by 
studying infants and by eliciting affect expressions in 
situations which were not unusual in a lifelike situation. 
They tested the differentiation of facial expressions of 
emotion using two situations designed to elicit happiness, 
two designed to elicit surprise, and two to elicit fear. 
Results for the two surprise eliciting conditions (that is, 
looking at infants' reaction to toy-switch and vanishing 
object) revealed that these tasks elicited blends of 
emotions rather than a single emotion such as surprise or 
fear or happiness. There is a high possibility that infants 
in all three cognitive levels in this study also elicited 
blends of emotions when retrieving the doll with a body part 
missing. However, infants in cognitive levels five and six 
were able to manifest their emotions more strongly than 
infants in cognitive level four. This could explain the 
extremely low means for affective responses in the study of 
part-whole relations with infants at cognitive level four. 
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The general failure to observe facial expressions in 
cognitive level four infants indicated that the stimulus 
(that is, dismemberment of the limbs) was not effective in 
causing these infants to be particularly surprised, or that 
the infants were unaware that the object was incomplete 
after the transformation. 
Past research suggests that it is not easy deciphering 
facial expressions (Hiatt, Campos, & Erode, 1979; Izard 1977; 
Ramsay & Campos 1978; 1979) due to the blend of emotions 
elicited in affective responses. Another explanation could 
be that the emotions were fleeting (Hiatt, Campos, & Erode, 
1979). While coding the data, the raters looked at the 
video playback in real times and could have missed the 
salient features that might hint at surprise or puzzlement 
(Ramsay & Campos, 1979). In the future, raters might look 
at video playback at a slower time. This might enable the 
raters to pick out emotions easier than when the video 
playback is at regular time, as suggested by Ramsay and 
Campos (1979). The features that the raters looked at in 
determining the affective responses of the infants were 
eyebrowfforeheadfnasal root, eyesfnosefcheeks, and 
mouth/lips regions (Izard 1980). Therefore, if the emotion 
elicited was surprise, the infant should have displayed 
curved and high eyebrows, wide open eyes, and roundish 
opened mouth. A component of these features is shown in 
Appendix A. 
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The analysis of this study showed some differences from 
Shafie, Self, and Allen's (1984) study. Their study 
revealed that twelve to fifteen months old infants showed 
stronger surprise and puzzlement than both younger and older 
infants. This present study showed that infants in 
cognitive levels five and six, that is, approximate age is 
between thirteen to twenty-four months, showed stronger 
affective responses than cognitive level four infants. 
Included in this study were infants twenty to twenty-four 
months old which the previous study omitted. 
Shafie, Self, and Allen (1984) looked at infants' 
affective responses using ages eight to eleven months, 
twelve to fifteen months, and sixteen to nineteen months. 
The present study looked at the last three cognitive levels 
of Piaget's (1954) sensorimotor stage, that is, cognitive 
levels four, five, and six. The approximate ages of the 
infants were divided as such: Nine to twelve months old, 
thirteen to seventeen months old, and finally eighteen to 
twenty-four months old. Eight-month-old infants were 
excluded from the present study. Besides excluding eight-
month-old infants in the present study, the tasks presented 
differed from those of Shafie, Self, and Allen (1984). 
Testing infants with other tasks was included in the present 
study in addition to the standard object permanence task. 
For example. finding an object which was completely covered 
with a single screen in two places alternately (AB error 
task), finding an object which was completely covered with a 
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single screen in three places, finding an object following 
one invisible displacement with a single screen, and finding 
an object following one invisible displacement with two 
screens. Infants in this study are given the tasks that are 
appropriate for their cognitive levels. Therefore, infants 
in cognitive level 4 will not be given invisible 
displacement tasks since they may not have exhibited the 
capacity to mental representation. Following failure of a 
task not specified in Uz9iris and Hunt (1975; 1989) and 
Dunst (1985) manuals for these infants, they were not given 
further tasks other than the standard object permanence 
task. The purpose of testing cognitive levels five and six 
infants with the aforementioned tasks was to look at the 
completion of these tasks and the success in searching for 
the missing body part. The older infants had the abilities 
to search for invisible displacements of objects by mental 
representation. Infants at cognitive level four failed in 
invisible displacement tasks due to their lack of 
representational skills (Hiatt, Campos, & Emde, 1979; 
Piaget, 1954; Ramsay & Campos, 1978; 1979; Shafie, Self, & 
Allen, 1984). Infants in cognitive levels five and six were 
more likely to succeed in searching for the missing body 
part after having accomplished mental representation. Also, 
infants in cognitive level six were able to use recall 
memory to search for the missing body part. 
This present study supported Shafie, Self, and Allen 
(1984), and Piaget and Inhelder (1973) claims that infants 
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in cognitive level six were able to use their reconstructive 
memory to search for objects. Whereas infants in cognitive 
level four relied mainly on their recognition memory, which, 
according to Piaget and Inhelder (1973), was the most basic 
form of memory, to see if they noticed the differences in 
the object. Substage six infants were able to use their 
recall memory to look for the missing body part since they 
were able to match the missing body part to the incomplete 
object even though they had difficulties 'fixing' the parts 
together. Piaget (1954) claimed that infants in substage 
three, that is between ages four to eight months, had the 
abilities to infer incomplete objects when only parts were 
made visible to them. By the time they reached cognitive 
level four, they should be able to differentiate between 
parts and wholes. Thus, infants in cognitive level four 
should be able to search for the missing body part of the 
doll. However, that was not the case in this study. If 
infants did not successfully searched for the missing body 
part by 120 seconds, the investigator would scored that task 
as unsuccessful. The only difference with success of the 
tasks with cognitive levels five and six could be the time 
or latency factor. 
The salience of the missing part did not impact 
generally upon infants' performance. Surprisingly, this 
factor was significant only in affect. It did not impact 
the infants' performances for the amount of visual and 
manual search, and latency to visual and manual search. 
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The results showed that infants in all three cognitive 
levels showed significant affective responses when they 
retrieved the incomplete object from beneath the cover. The 
head of the object generated more visual and manual search 
than the other two missing body parts. One explanation was 
that infants in all three cognitive levels were more likely 
to focus on the face of the doll since the face was more 
animated. Perhaps the feature of the face proved more 
interesting and more life like to the infants. It was not 
surprising that the arm generated the lowest means in visual 
and manual search. The arm was the smallest part of all 
three body parts in this study. The infants could have 
dismissed the importance of the arm since it was not as 
salient as the head or the leg. Once again, these infants 
were more likely to notice the feature of the face of the 
doll than the other two body parts. The time taken for the 
latency to visual and manual search is lower for the head 
than either the arm or the leg. 
Salience of the missing body parts did not reveal 
significantly affect in the amount of visual and manual 
search, and latency to visual and manual search. An 
affective response was shown by infants in all three 
cognitive levels. They elicited more affective responses 
for the missing head than either the leg or the arm. Means 
for the affective responses for the head is 4.1667, followed 
by 3.5417 for the leg, and 3.4167 for the arm. 
The interaction of cognitive levels of infants and 
salience of the missing body parts showed no significance 
for the outcome. For the amount of visual and manual 
search, latency to visual and manual search, and affect, 
cognitive level and salience of the missing part were not 
significant in the infants' performances. However, it 
approached significance on the measure of affective 
responsiveness. In actual scores, it was revealed that 
infants in cognitive level four found the arm twice (n = 
16). These infants found the missing leg five times (n = 
16), and they found the missing head three times (n = 16). 
However, four infants in cognitive level five did not 
succeed in looking for the missing arm (n = 16), five missed 
the leg (n = 16), and three did not look or failed to 
recover the head (n = 16). Three infants at cognitive level 
six, however, missed the arm (n = 16), one did not succeed 
in looking for the leg (n = 16), and all 16 infants at 
cognitive level six found the head underneath the cover. 
Infants at substage four according to Piaget (1954) 
were capable of active search for visible displacement of 
object. They were also capable of removing the cover to 
look for the object. In this study, the tasks were slightly 
modified so that when infants in cognitive level four 
retrieved the incomplete object, they were required to look 
for the missing body part. In order to accomplish the part-
whole tasks, the infants had to rely on their recognition 
memory to look for the missing body part. There were three 
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parts to Piaget and Inhelder {1973) recognition memory. 
They were elementary recognition; recognition memory, which 
involved the assimilation of an existing schema; and 
recognition at the higher levels, which bound with mobile 
and differentiated schemata. The majority of the infants at 
cognitive level four in this study were not able to use 
recognition memory to look for the missing body parts. One 
explanation could be that they were not given enough time to 
search for the missing body parts. The investigator allowed 
the infants about 120 seconds to search for the missing body 
parts. After the time limit, she immediately performed 
another tasks thus depriving the infants from further 
searching of the missing body parts. 
Moore, Borton, & Darby {1978) on the other hand, 
believed that mentally representing of an object marked the 
beginning of achieving an understanding of object permanence 
rather than the end {Piaget, 1954). Therefore, according to 
Moore, Borton, & Darby, infants at cognitive level four had 
achieved the ability of mental representation. However, 
Moore, Borton, & Darby (1978) claimed that even if infants 
at cognitive level four were capable of mental 
representation, they were still unable to understand that an 
object has an identity of its own when disappeared and then 
reappeared. Therefore, in this study, the inability of most 
of the infants in substage four to look for the miss1ng body 
parts could attribute to the failure of their comprehension 
of the identity of the object. 
73 
Another explanation in this study with infants in 
cognitive level four was that infants at this level had a 
subjective conception of objects, position, and movement. 
Therefore, they were likely to make what Piaget (1954) 
ca·lled the stage four search error, or the AB error. AB 
error occurred when infants continuously search at a 
specific location (A) even when the object was hidden at 
another location (B). In this study, the retrieving of the 
incomplete object was considered A. The missing body part, 
which was still hidden, was in location B. Thus, infants 
failure to retrieve the missing body part in this study had 
made the AB error. 
According to Piaget and Inhelder (1973), infants in 
cognitive level five had the ability to intentional 
reproduction of a particular action and its results. These 
infants were able to reconstruct an object or a 
configuration without prior constructions of a 'schematized 
action'. Therefore, then infants in cognitive level five in 
these study were able to succeed in the recovery of the 
missing body parts. 
For infants in cognitive level six, they combined 
intentionality and mental representation to discover 
solutions to problems. The problem in this study is that a 
body part is missing. The solution is for these infants to 
look for the missing Qody part. Combining the skills they 
have acquired, it is not surprising that infants at 
cognitive level six were more successful in searching for 
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the missing body part. Infants in cognitive level six were 
more successful in the search for the missing body parts 
could also attribute to their ability to complete 
internalization of the object (Piaget & Inhelder, 1973) or 
what was considered to be associ~tive memory (Watson, 1980). 
This study showed the importance of cognitive level in 
infants' performance of the part-whole tasks in the amount 
of visual and manual search, latency to visual and manual 
latency, and affective responses. However, salience of the 
missing body part was not significant in this study in the 
amount of visual and manual search and latency to visual and 
manual search. Salience of the missing body parts in the 
amount of affective responsiveness was significant. For the 
interaction of cognitive level and salience of the missing 
body part, no significant differences were accounted for by 
the amount of visual and manual search, latency to visual 
and manual search, and an almost significance with affect 
responses. 
In conclusion, Piaget and Inhelder's (1973) theory of 
recall memory is better differentiated in this study. The 
level of recall memory is discernable between cognitive 
levels four and six, cognitive levels five and six but not 
between cognitive levels four and five. 
Future studies in object permanence and infant memory 
development are encouraged to look at theories by other 
scientists such as Cummings and Bjork, Watson, and Sophian. 
To further substantiate the literature on object permanence 
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and infant memory development, future studies need to look 
at different aspects of information processing as per 
Howard's model (1983). Also, further studies need to 
include how infants, who are blind from birth, process 
information with object permanence, especially part-whole 
tasks, without ever having seen the object(s). There is 
also a need to look at how infants who are developmentally 
delayed, and how infants from diverse cultural background, 
process information. 
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APPENDIX A 
MAXIMALLY DISCRIMINITIVE FACIAL MOVEMENTS {MAX) CODES 
Brow (B) Forehead (F); Nasal root (N) 
20. B: Raised in arched or normal shape. {F: Long 
transverse furrows or thickening; N: Narrowed.) 
21. B: One brow raised higher than other {other one may be 
slightly lowered). 
22. B: Raised; drawn together, straight or normal shape. 
{F: Short transverse furrows or thickening in mid-
region; N: Narrowed). 
23. B: Inner corners raised; shape under inner corner; {F: 
Bulge or furrows in center above brow corners; N: 
Narrowed). 
Eyes/Nose/Cheeks 
30. Enlarged, roundish appearance of eye region ow1ng to 
tissue between upper lid and brow being stretched 
{upper eye furrows may be visible); upper eyelids not 
raised. 
31. Eye fissure widened, upper l1d raised {white shows more 
than normal). 
33. Narrowed or squinted {by action of eye sphincters or 
brow depressors. 
36. Gaze downward, askance. 
38. Cheeks raised. 
Mouth/Lips 
50. Opened, roundish or oval. 
51. Opened, relaxed. 
52. Corners pulled back and slightly up {open or closed). 
53. Opened, tense, corners retracted straight back. 
54. Angular, squarish {open). 
{Adapted from Berger, K.S. The Developing Person Through 
Childhood and Adolescence, 2nd Edition, 1984). 
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APPENDIX B 
OBJECT PERMANENCE 
scale eliciting critical scoring 
step context behaviors 1 2 3 
5 visible secures object 
displacement hidden under a 
single screen 
6 visible secures object 
displacement hidden under one 
of two screens 
hidden alternately 
7 visible sec;:ures object 
displacement under one of three 
screens hidden 
alternately 
9 invisible secures object 
displacement hidden with a 
single screen 
11 invisible secures object 
displacement hidden with two 
screens hidden 
alternately 
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APPENDIX C 
PART WHOLE TASKS 
arm leq head 
*T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2 
amount of visual search 
Range 1-7 
amount of manual search 
Range 1-7 
latency to visual search 
In seconds 
latency in manual search 
In seconds 
affect (1-3) 
*T1 T2 = Trial 1 and Trial 2 
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